that deviate from the normal behavior of a system. One of the ways to achieve this is by identifying the phenomena that characterize "normal" observations. Subsequently, based on the characteristics of data learned from the "normal" observations, new observations are classified as being either "normal" or not.
I. INTRODUCTION
The state-of-the-art in anomaly detection works with the assumption that both normal and anomalous data follow data distributions that are stationary. While this is, in one sense, acceptable, it is still a limitation on the types of detections possible, and sets the boundary on what is currently solvable.
The aim of this paper is to relax this limitation, and to consider how novel estimation methods can be used to achieve spam filtering and the detection of anomalous data even when the underlying distributions change with time. In that sense, this paper is of a pioneering sort! Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are designed to identify security violations targeted against a resource or a network so that alerts can be given in a timely manner which allows for Justin Zhan, faculty member at North Carolina A&T State University, USA. E-mail: jcrisostomo@cmu.edu 978-1-61284-4577-0085-9/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE mitigation of related security problems at the earliest possible time. Host-based IDSs make use of information available on a specific machine to detect malicious activities involving such machine or host. Most approaches involve monitoring system calls to detect intrusions. However, previous works have also explored the processing other types of host information includ ing Windows registry accesses [1] and sequences of commands issued on the command line [2] . In addition to these, some approaches take advantage of more information by inspecting the arguments to system calls [3] .
Aside from the type of data being processed, host-based IDS also differ in terms of how such information is processed to determine if an observation is malicious or not. Forrest et al. [4] identified two basic approaches. Misuse intrusion detection compares new observations to previously known malicious patterns or signatures to identify intrusions. Anomaly intrusion detection, on the other hand, tests new observations against known normal patterns and a discrepancy between the two will determine if there is an intrusion or not. Normal behavior can be represented in several ways using system call information.
In [5] , the authors compared several approaches in modeling the behavior of a system. One such method is done by keeping a database of sequences of system calls representing normal behavior. This approach was utilized in [4] where new observed sequences are looked up in the database and the frequency of mismatches that occur between the sequences in a trace and the ones in the records determine the anomaly score.
Another is by using the frequency of occurrence of system call patterns in a sequence. One such example is used in [4] and [6] where each trace is represented as a bag of system calls. In this model, only frequencies of each system call are considered and sequence information is lost. This was idea was borrowed from an approach used in text classification where each document is represented as a bag words wherein only the frequency of the words are taken into account. An even simpler representation is done by only recording the presence of the words in a document. Using this representation, a trace can be thought of as the document while system calls are the words in a document.
Intrusion detection is just one of the possible applications of system call anomaly detection. It would be worthwhile to note that anomalies occurring in system call traces may be caused by several things. Although it may well be caused by malicious activity, we do not disregard the possibility that errors and malfunctions occurred in the system. Yet another cause might be an unusual but legitimate activity.
The objective of this paper is to detect anomaly activ ities in intrusion detection systems. The proposed solution is to employ a Stochastic Learning-based Weak Estimator (SLWE) [7] , which is a novel estimation method that has demonstrated promising results in detecting source changes for the purpose of adaptive file compression. The rationale for choosing a weak estimator for non-stationary environments is that estimators that converge with a probability of 1 (e.g.
the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and Bayesian estimates) cannot easily unlearn and adapt to the changes in the new environment.
II. RELATED WORK

A. System Call Anomaly Detection
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are designed to identify security violations targeted against a resource or a network so that alerts can be given in a timely manner which allows for mitigation of related security problems at the earliest possible time. Host-based IDSs make use of information available on a specific machine to detect malicious activities involving such machine or host. Most approaches involve monitoring system calls to detect intrusions. However, previous works have also explored the processing other types of host information includ ing Windows registry accesses [1] and sequences of commands issued on the command line [2] . In addition to these, some approaches take advantage of more information by inspecting the arguments to system calls [3] .
Aside from the type of data being processed, host-based IDS also differ in terms of how such information is processed to determine if an observation is malicious or not. Forrest et al. Normal behavior can be represented in several ways using system call information. In [5] , the authors compared several approaches in modeling the behavior of a system. One such method is done by keeping a database of sequences of system calls representing normal behavior. This approach was utilized in [4] where new observed sequences are looked up in the database and the frequency of mismatches that occur between the sequences in a trace and the ones in the records determine the anomaly score. Another is by using the frequency of occurrence of system call patterns in a sequence. One such example is used in [4] and [6] Intrusion detection is just one of the possible applications of system call anomaly detection. It would be worthwhile to note that anomalies occurring in system call traces may be caused by several things. Although it may well be caused by malicious activity, we do not disregard the possibility that errors and malfunctions occurred in the system. Yet another cause might be an unusual but legitimate activity.
B. Stochastic Learning-based Weak Estimator
The SLWE has been utilized in a variety of applications that involve estimating distributions in non-stationary environ ments. One of its major applications is in data compression where the SL WE was used to estimate the probabilities of the source symbols allowing for an adaptive single-pass encoding process [8] . Moreover, results from pattern classification ex periments with synthetic data have also shown that the use of weak estimation is more robust than MLE methods in identifying data source changes [7] . A recent work on an efficient routing algorithm for mobile ad-hoc networks has also utilized the aforementioned estimation scheme [9] . In their proposed solution, the authors have used the SLWE in the route selection algorithm to efficiently estimate the packet delivery probability among different available paths. Finally, a newly proposed strategy for a source address reputation system involves the use of the SLWE in conjunction with a linear classifier for packet classification [10] . In this scheme, each packet is composed of symbols which have to be classified as belonging to one of two classes. Since the actual distribution of the symbols is unknown, the SLWE was utilized to update the estimates for each new observation. These and various other works have explored the applications of weak estimation. In this paper, we investigate its applicability in spam filtering tasks.
III. WEAK ESTIMATION ApPROACH
There are a few problems which we have recently en countered, where strong estimators pose a real-life concern.
One scenario occurs in pattern classification involving moving scenes. The same situation is also encountered when one attempts the adaptive encoding of files which are interspersed with text, formulae, images and tables. Similarly, if we are dealing with adaptive data structures, the structure changes based on the information about the underlying data distribu tion, which is given by the estimator. Thus, if the estimator used is "strong" (i.e., it converges w. p. 1), it is unlikely that the learned data structure will change from a structure that it has converged to. Indeed, we can conclusively demonstrate that it is sub-optimal to work with strong estimators in such application domains, i.e., when the data is truly non-stationary.
In this section, we will introduce ! a Stochastic Learning Weak Estimator (SLWE), and which is developed by using the principles of stochastic learning [7] . In essence, the estimate is updated at each time instant based on the value of the current sample. However, this updating is not achieved using an additive updating rule, but rather by a multiplicative rule, akin to the family of linear action-probability updating schemes
[11], [12] . The formal results that we have obtained for the binomial distribution are quite encouraging. To render the lThe rest of this section essentially cite the results from [7] , and these are included here to render this paper to be a self-contained document. explanation simple, let us assume that the learning updating rule has a user-defined coefficient, A. We shall show that our new estimator converges weakly, and that this convergence is independent of the value of the learning coefficient, A. Furthermore, the rate of convergence, is determined completely by the eigenvalue of the transition matrix of the underlying learning process, which is an explicit function of only A.
Besides, the variance of the estimate is also controlled by the same learning coefficient, A. Analogous results are available for the multinomial case.
Let us assume that the estimated parameters follow a binomial/multinomial distribution. The binomial distribution is characterized by two parameters, namely, the number of Bernoulli trials, and the parameter characterizing each Bernoulli trial. In this regard, we assume that the number of observations is the number of trials. The aim is thus to estimate the Bernoulli parameter for each trial, which is achieved here by using stochastic learning methods.
Let X be a binomially distributed random variable, which takes on the value of either '1' or '2 , 2 . We assume that X obeys the distribution S, where S = [SI, s2f. In other words, X '1' with probability SI '2' with probability S2 , where, SI +S2 = 1. Let x( n) be a concrete realization of X at time 'n'. The intention of the exercise is to estimate S, i.e., S; for i = 1,2. We achieve this by maintaining a running estimate P(n) = [PI (n),P2(n)f of S, where p;(n) is the estimate of S; at time 'n', for i = 1,2. Then, the value of PI (n) is updated as per the following simple rule 3 :
where A is a user-defined parameter, 0 < A < 1, and P2(n + 1) +-1-PI(n+ 1).
In the interest of simplicity, we omit the index n, whenever there is no confusion, and thus, in such cases, we use P and P(n) interchangeably.
The result below shows that the mean of P, obtained as per as per Equations (1) and (2), converges exactly to S.
Theorem 1: Let X be a binomially distributed random variable, and P( n) be the estimate of S at time 'n'. Then,
Proof Based on the updating scheme specified by Equa tions (1) and (2), the conditional expected value of PI (n + 1) given P can be seen to be: Ta king expectations a second time, we can write (5) as: E[ pI(oo)](I-A) = (I-A)SI , (7) implying that E [PI (00)] = SI. Similarly, E [P2 (00)] = S2, and the result follows.
•
The next results which we present, indicates that E[P(n+ 1)] is related to E[P(n)] by means of a stochastic matrix. We prove this result and its implications.
Theorem 2: If the components of P(n + 1) are obtained from the components of P(n) as per Equations (1) and (2), where M is a stochastic matrix. Thus, the limiting value of the expectation of P(.) converges to S, and the rate of convergence of P to S is fully determined by A.
Proof Consider the vector form of (6), obtained by replacing the term (1 -A )SI by (1 -A )SI PI + (1 -A )SI P2, since PI + P2 = 1. Substituting the above equality, simplifying and taking expectations again leads to the following vectorial form:
S2 + ASI
This proves the first claim of the theorem.
The second claim of the theorem follows by solving the vectorial difference equation, and taking the limit as n is increased to infinity. The final result follows since the only non-unity eigenvalue of (8) is A.
• From the analysis given above, we can derive the explicit expression for the asymptotic variance of the SLWE. We show that a small value of A leads to fast convergence and a large variance. As opposed to this, a large value of A implies slow convergence and a small variance.
Theorem 3: Let X be a binomially distributed random vari able governed by the distribution S, and P( n) be the estimate of S at time 'n' obtained by (1) and (2) . Then, the algebraic expression for the variance of P( 00) is fully determined by A.
Proof Using the same notation as above, the square of PI at time 'n + l' is given by: which can also be expressed as:
where the last equalities hold since E [PI (00)] = SI. Thus:
We finally compute the variance of PI (00) as below:
since S 2 = 1 -SI, and the theorem is thus proved.
• When A -7 1, the variance tends to zero, implying mean square convergence. The maximum value of the variance is attained when A = 0, and the minimum value of the variance is achieved when A = 1. Also, when A is close to unity, the estimates are dominated by the initial values. Our result seems to be contradictory to our initial goal. When we motivated our problem, we were working with the notion that the environment was non-stationary. However, the results we have derived are asymptotic, and thus, are valid only as n -7 00. While this could prove to be a handicap, realistically, and for all practical purposes, the convergence takes place after a relatively small values of n. Thus, if A is even as "small" as 0.9, after 50 iterations, the variation from the asymptotic value will be of the order of 10-50 , because A also determines the rate of convergence, and this occurs in a geometric manner [11] . In other words, even if the environment switches its Bernoulli parameter after 50 steps, the SLWE will be able to track this change. Observe too that we do not need to introduce or consider the use of a "sliding window".
We conclude this section by presenting the updating rule given in (1) and (2) in the context of some schemes already reported in the literature. If we assume that X can take values of '0' and '1', then the probability of '1' at time n + 1 can be estimated as follows 5 :
S Note that this expression is equivalent to that of the standard sample mean estimator.
n+l n+l
This expression can be seen to be a particular case of the rule (1) and (2) , where the parameter A = 1 -n!1 . This kind of rule is typically used in stochas tic approximation [13] , and in some reinforcement learning schemes, such as the Q-Iearning [14] . What we have done is to show that when such a rule is used in estimation, the mean converges to the true mean (independent of the learning parameter A), and that the variance and rate of convergence are determined only by A. Furthermore, we have derived the explicit relationships for these dependencies.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To be able to assess the applicability of SLWE to system call anomaly detection, University of New Mexico system call datasets [15] were used. The following table summarizes the details about the datasets: Each file in the dataset contains the process ID of the running process and the system calls invoked. The traces used in the experiments have at least one system call. Both live-Ipr and live-Ipr (MIT) were collected from machines running on SunOS 4.1.4 where a total of 182 system calls can possibly be called. live-lpr was collected from 77 hosts while live-lpr mit was collected from a single host. Because traces of only one program are collected, only a subset of the total system calls appeared in the traces. The denial of service data was collected from a Linux 2.0.35 machine where a total of 164 system calls are available. For this dataset, the "stide" analysis program traces were collected under normal circumstances as well as when it was interrupted by a denial of service attack. Details about the datasets are available in [5] .
A. Representation
The bag of system calls representation was used for the experiments. In [6] , the authors argued that approaches involv ing comparison of fixed-length contiguous system call subse quences require a database whose size increases exponentially with the length of the subsequence. Due to this, the effective ness of the bag of system calls representation was explored. This approach allows for faster learning and lower memory requirements. Although using this type of representation may not be effective against mimicry attacks, experimental results have shown that for some scenarios, it is possible to achieve nearly perfect detection and false positive rates. Similar to [7] , the multinomial model is utilized and each process trace d is represented by a feature vector -t = (XI ,X2, ... ,xm) where each Xi is the number of occurrences of system call ti in d. Furthermore, the conditional probability p( d I cs) where Cs refers to the normal class is determined as follows: m p( d I cs) = n (P( ti I cs) ti (16) i =1
The probability p( ti I cs) can be estimated using Multinomial SLWE. Given that only normal observations are available dur ing training, when a system call s is observed, the probability of each system call ti is updated as follows:
p ' ( ti I cs) = { AP( ti I cs) + ( I-A )'ijeJip( t j I cs), Ap( ti I cs),
Unlike the experiments on email data.it is possible to use all the system calls as features since they are significantly less in number (less than 200) compared to all the possible terms that might occur in an email. For the experiments, either all the system calls or a subset of the system calls were used as features. For the latter, only system calls that were observed during training are included in the feature vector. An additional feature was included for unseen system calls. So for m observed system calls during training, the feature vector -t = XI ,X2, ... ,Xm, Xm+ where the Xm+ I th feature stores the combined frequency of all unseen system calls in a trace.
C. One-class Naive Bayes
As in [2] , P( ti I cs) is only computed for the normal class, cs. For ca, the anomaly class, it is assumed that each system call has an equal probability 11m. The conditional probabilities are then computed and their ratio is compared to a threshold:
If the value is higher that the threshold T, d is assigned to class Cs otherwise it belongs to Ca.
D. Distance Metric
Unlike one-class Nave Bayes, the method used is similar to the experiments done for source detection in [7] . Here, the Euclidean distance metric is used to compute the distance be tween two vectors, which serves as the basis for classification. The algorithm is described as follows:
Let Ps and Pa be the estimates for the probability of system calls for the self and anomaly classes after training and let vectors If s and If a contain the probabilities of each system call for both estimates. For each new process trace d, q s = If s and q a = If a are maintained. Whenever a new system call, Ci is observed, we compute q C,s which is the estimate q s updated with the new observation Ci. The same is done for q a producing q c , a' The Euclidean distance between q sand q c , s For every trace, (I) a copy of the learned model is used. Whenever a new system call is encountered a (2) temporary copy is used and (3) both vectors are updated using the new system call. (4) The distance between the updated and non-updated vectors is compared and (5) the system call will be assigned to the class that minimizes this distance.
is computed as well as q a and q c , a' If the former minimizes this distance, then q s = q C,s, otherwise, q a = q c , a'
After each trace with n system calls has terminated, the frequency fa of the identified anomalies for that trace is observed. 1;:-is then compared to a threshold T . Values above T will result in the whole trace being classified as an anomaly, otherwise the trace will be classified as normal.
E. Training
Training is done once at the beginning of each test run. Fur thermore, only normal observations are used during training. For the tests in this section, training was done on the first 100 traces. For tests that included only observed system calls in the feature vector, the resulting size m of the feature vector was 42 system calls out of 182 for both live-lpr and live-lpr mit and 19 system calls out of 164 for the denial-of-service dataset.
V. RESULTS
A. One-Class Naive Bayes
Tests were done on all three datasets using only the system calls seen during training. Because the classification method used entailed the use of a threshold, ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves were used to present the performance of each filter across several threshold values. Figure 2 shows the ROC curves for the latter tests using different values of A . In addition to the ROC curves, the Area under the ROC curve (AUC) was also computed using [16] . Using this measure, values closer to 1.0 are preferred. This means that the system is able to detect anomalies with very little false positives. The AUC values are shown in Ta ble II.
For one-class Naive Bayes, both lpr-live and lpr-live-mit have a favorable average performance using different values for the learning coefficient. On the other hand, when tested on the denial-of-service dataset, the results were not as favorable. The lambda value that gave the best results within the shown range is 0.85 which gives an AUC of around 0.71. However, : if"
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•.
•. 0 . if the A value is not carefully chosen, the performance drops significantly. It can also be noticed that the performance decreases as A increases for this particular dataset. Tests were done on all three datasets using an exhaustive list of all system calls as features and another set of tests were done using only the system calls seen during training. Figure   3 shows the ROC curves for the latter tests using different values of A. This implies that for attacks such as denial of service on an application program that uses almost always a fixed set of system calls but of varying trace lengths, using frequencies to represent a process trace removes information that would be very helpful in detection: the order of the system calls. The lpr intrusion data was described in [8] where a vulnerability in lpr was utilized in a script that was used to replace the contents of an arbitrary file. Looking into the frequency of system calls per trace, almost all of the anomalous traces vary greatly from the normal observations in terms of frequency per trace. For example, for both lpr datasets, read and write almost always have frequencies of 16 and 7 respectively while normal traces have higher frequencies and are more varied. The good performance that resulted from tests on these two datasets implies that frequency information was enough to differentiate between normal and anomalous traces. The results from the denial of service dataset imply that for application programs such as stide, which exhibit quite a varied behavior, frequency information is not sufficient to distinguish denial of service attacks. This suggests that putting some information about the system call sequence in representing each trace is expected to improve the detector's performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anomaly detection in systems calls is an important issue that has attracted much research attention. 
